Legal Reasoning MCQ Quiz - Objective Question with Answer for Legal Reasoning - Download Free PDF

Artificial Intelligence is rapidly evolving into a powerful force in human communication, now capable of outperforming people in structured debates. A recent study from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne reveals that large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT can construct persuasive, rational arguments—and even tailor them based on an opponent’s personal information to increase their effectiveness. In a world already grappling with misinformation, conspiracy theories, and political polarisation, this raises grave concerns about how such tools might be weaponised. The ability to manipulate public opinion with customised, data-driven arguments could lead to a dangerous escalation of “alternative facts” and digitally amplified falsehoods.

However, the true threat lies not within the AI itself, but in the intentions of the humans who control it. As computational linguist Emily M. Bender famously described, AI is a “stochastic parrot”—a machine that generates convincing language without understanding its meaning. Debate, at its core, is a human pursuit, shaped by emotion, ideology, and power. AI remains a tool, not a sentient participant. Therefore, if it causes harm, the responsibility lies squarely with its users. The unsettling reality is not that AI can mislead people, but that flawed, ambitious humans can wield it to serve destructive ends.

In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court of India recently invalidated two executive notifications issued by the Union Ministry of Environment that allowed industries to operate or expand without obtaining prior environmental clearance. These notifications, introduced in 2017 and 2021 respectively, permitted industries to apply for post-facto clearances by paying hefty fines, effectively bypassing the core principle of “prior approval” enshrined in the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification of 2006. Critics argued that this undermined the legislative intent and bypassed the parliamentary process, as these notifications were issued through executive orders without amending the parent law — the Environment Protection Act, 1986.

The central government justified its actions by citing economic needs and the risk of disruption to functioning industries. It referred to earlier attempts under the UPA government to introduce regularisation procedures and pointed to similar cases where courts opted for a balanced approach. However, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of prior clearance and held that the regularisation route through executive orders was illegal. It allowed those industries that had already availed of the 2017 and 2021 processes to remain unaffected, highlighting the need for stronger enforcement by regional authorities. The judgment aims to ensure that economic development does not come at the cost of environmental accountability and rule of law.

In the backdrop of a rising trend of decimation of rights for people who do not fit into the binary of male and female, led by the U.S. administration, a recent U.K. Supreme Court ruling has further polarised the gender debate. In an 88-page judgment, five judges unanimously ruled that only biological women and not transwomen meet the definition of a woman under Britain’s Equality Act 2010. In its limited scope of deliberation, it provided a “statutory interpretation” that the terms ‘woman’ and ‘sex’ in the Act refer only to a biological woman and the biological sex. A transwoman who has undergone a gender reassignment and has a gender recognition certificate as a woman for all purposes would lose the right to be treated as a biological woman. While the appellants in the case, For Women Scotland, funded in part by gender-critical writer J.K. Rowling, celebrated the verdict saying they had been vindicated, trans supporters and campaigners felt it was a setback for trans inclusion. There has been a considerable change in the resolve of the original respondents, The Scottish Ministers, too with the resignation of Scottish National Party leader Nicola Sturgeon in 2023. She had led the fight to change gender laws so that those with gender recognition certificates could be entitled to the same protections as biological women. But there was a backlash against gender recognition reforms after a trans woman, who had raped two women while she was a man, was initially sent to an all-female prison.

The ruling made the point that the Gender Recognition Act 2004 gives legal recognition to the rights of transgender people on marriage, pensions, retirement and social security, and that the equality law protects them against discrimination. Kishwer Falkner, the chair of the U.K.’s Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), said the court’s “clarity” means only “biological women could use single-sex changing rooms and women’s toilets, or participate in women-only sporting events and teams, or be placed in women’s wards in hospitals”. But as the judges counselled against reading the judgment as a triumph for one or more groups in society at the expense of another, the EHRC should also ensure that unisex or neutral spaces are earmarked for trans people when it issues new guidelines. That holds true for all institutions, offices, hospitals and schools, planning restrictions. The ruling will have an impact on the sporting arena where athletics, cycling and aquatics have already banned transgender women from participating in women’s events. As the experience with India’s Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act 2019 shows, any changes in the legal framework must factor in the trans people’s basic rights or else they will face more strictures.

In the backdrop of a rising trend of decimation of rights for people who do not fit into the binary of male and female, led by the U.S. administration, a recent U.K. Supreme Court ruling has further polarised the gender debate. In an 88-page judgment, five judges unanimously ruled that only biological women and not transwomen meet the definition of a woman under Britain’s Equality Act 2010. In its limited scope of deliberation, it provided a “statutory interpretation” that the terms ‘woman’ and ‘sex’ in the Act refer only to a biological woman and the biological sex. A transwoman who has undergone a gender reassignment and has a gender recognition certificate as a woman for all purposes would lose the right to be treated as a biological woman. While the appellants in the case, For Women Scotland, funded in part by gender-critical writer J.K. Rowling, celebrated the verdict saying they had been vindicated, trans supporters and campaigners felt it was a setback for trans inclusion. There has been a considerable change in the resolve of the original respondents, The Scottish Ministers, too with the resignation of Scottish National Party leader Nicola Sturgeon in 2023. She had led the fight to change gender laws so that those with gender recognition certificates could be entitled to the same protections as biological women. But there was a backlash against gender recognition reforms after a trans woman, who had raped two women while she was a man, was initially sent to an all-female prison.

The ruling made the point that the Gender Recognition Act 2004 gives legal recognition to the rights of transgender people on marriage, pensions, retirement and social security, and that the equality law protects them against discrimination. Kishwer Falkner, the chair of the U.K.’s Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), said the court’s “clarity” means only “biological women could use single-sex changing rooms and women’s toilets, or participate in women-only sporting events and teams, or be placed in women’s wards in hospitals”. But as the judges counselled against reading the judgment as a triumph for one or more groups in society at the expense of another, the EHRC should also ensure that unisex or neutral spaces are earmarked for trans people when it issues new guidelines. That holds true for all institutions, offices, hospitals and schools, planning restrictions. The ruling will have an impact on the sporting arena where athletics, cycling and aquatics have already banned transgender women from participating in women’s events. As the experience with India’s Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act 2019 shows, any changes in the legal framework must factor in the trans people’s basic rights or else they will face more strictures.

In the backdrop of a rising trend of decimation of rights for people who do not fit into the binary of male and female, led by the U.S. administration, a recent U.K. Supreme Court ruling has further polarised the gender debate. In an 88-page judgment, five judges unanimously ruled that only biological women and not transwomen meet the definition of a woman under Britain’s Equality Act 2010. In its limited scope of deliberation, it provided a “statutory interpretation” that the terms ‘woman’ and ‘sex’ in the Act refer only to a biological woman and the biological sex. A transwoman who has undergone a gender reassignment and has a gender recognition certificate as a woman for all purposes would lose the right to be treated as a biological woman. While the appellants in the case, For Women Scotland, funded in part by gender-critical writer J.K. Rowling, celebrated the verdict saying they had been vindicated, trans supporters and campaigners felt it was a setback for trans inclusion. There has been a considerable change in the resolve of the original respondents, The Scottish Ministers, too with the resignation of Scottish National Party leader Nicola Sturgeon in 2023. She had led the fight to change gender laws so that those with gender recognition certificates could be entitled to the same protections as biological women. But there was a backlash against gender recognition reforms after a trans woman, who had raped two women while she was a man, was initially sent to an all-female prison.

The ruling made the point that the Gender Recognition Act 2004 gives legal recognition to the rights of transgender people on marriage, pensions, retirement and social security, and that the equality law protects them against discrimination. Kishwer Falkner, the chair of the U.K.’s Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), said the court’s “clarity” means only “biological women could use single-sex changing rooms and women’s toilets, or participate in women-only sporting events and teams, or be placed in women’s wards in hospitals”. But as the judges counselled against reading the judgment as a triumph for one or more groups in society at the expense of another, the EHRC should also ensure that unisex or neutral spaces are earmarked for trans people when it issues new guidelines. That holds true for all institutions, offices, hospitals and schools, planning restrictions. The ruling will have an impact on the sporting arena where athletics, cycling and aquatics have already banned transgender women from participating in women’s events. As the experience with India’s Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act 2019 shows, any changes in the legal framework must factor in the trans people’s basic rights or else they will face more strictures.

In holding that a divorced Muslim woman is not barred from invoking the secular remedy of seeking maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the Supreme Court of India has done well to clarify an important question concerning the impact of a 1986 law that appeared to restrict their relief to what is allowed in Muslim personal law alone. The enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, was a watershed moment that is seen as having undermined the country’s secular ethos by seeking to nullify a Court judgment in the Shah Bano case (1985), which allowed a divorced Muslim woman to apply for maintenance from a magistrate under Section 125 of the CrPC. Subsequently, the 1986 law was
upheld by a Constitution Bench in 2001 after coming close to declaring its provisions unconstitutional for discriminating against Muslim women. The Act was declared valid after the Bench read it down in such a way as not to foreclose the secular remedy for Muslim women. Several High Court judgments took different views on whether Muslim women should avail of Section 3 of the 1986 Act or Section 125 of CrPC. The latest verdict by a Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Augustine George Masih settles this question by holding that the codification of a Muslim woman’s rights in the 1986 Act including the right to maintenance during the Iddat period, provision for a dignified life until she remarries, and return of mehr and dowry was only in addition to and not in derogation of her right to seek maintenance like a woman of any other religion.
Justice Masih, in his main opinion, concludes that both the personal law provision and the secular remedy for seeking maintenance ought to exist in parallel in their distinct domains. While the CrPC may be invoked by a woman if she was unable to maintain herself, the 1986 Act makes it a Muslim husband’s obligation to provide for his divorced wife and her children up to a certain point. Justice Nagarathna, in her concurring opinion, looks at the social purpose behind the provision for maintenance in the CrPC, namely that it aims to prevent vagrancy among women by compelling the husband to support his wife. The 1986 Act codified the right available to a divorced Muslim woman in personal law. This right is in addition to, and not at the cost of, the rights available in existing law. The verdict is a great example of the Court using harmonious interpretation to expand the scope of rights as well as to secularise access to remedies. In the process, the Court has also neutralised the perception that the right of Muslim women seeking maintenance under secular provisions stood extinguished since 1986.

In holding that a divorced Muslim woman is not barred from invoking the secular remedy of seeking maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the Supreme Court of India has done well to clarify an important question concerning the impact of a 1986 law that appeared to restrict their relief to what is allowed in Muslim personal law alone. The enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, was a watershed moment that is seen as having undermined the country’s secular ethos by seeking to nullify a Court judgment in the Shah Bano case (1985), which allowed a divorced Muslim woman to apply for maintenance from a magistrate under Section 125 of the CrPC. Subsequently, the 1986 law was
upheld by a Constitution Bench in 2001 after coming close to declaring its provisions unconstitutional for discriminating against Muslim women. The Act was declared valid after the Bench read it down in such a way as not to foreclose the secular remedy for Muslim women. Several High Court judgments took different views on whether Muslim women should avail of Section 3 of the 1986 Act or Section 125 of CrPC. The latest verdict by a Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Augustine George Masih settles this question by holding that the codification of a Muslim woman’s rights in the 1986 Act including the right to maintenance during the Iddat period, provision for a dignified life until she remarries, and return of mehr and dowry was only in addition to and not in derogation of her right to seek maintenance like a woman of any other religion.
Justice Masih, in his main opinion, concludes that both the personal law provision and the secular remedy for seeking maintenance ought to exist in parallel in their distinct domains. While the CrPC may be invoked by a woman if she was unable to maintain herself, the 1986 Act makes it a Muslim husband’s obligation to provide for his divorced wife and her children up to a certain point. Justice Nagarathna, in her concurring opinion, looks at the social purpose behind the provision for maintenance in the CrPC, namely that it aims to prevent vagrancy among women by compelling the husband to support his wife. The 1986 Act codified the right available to a divorced Muslim woman in personal law. This right is in addition to, and not at the cost of, the rights available in existing law. The verdict is a great example of the Court using harmonious interpretation to expand the scope of rights as well as to secularise access to remedies. In the process, the Court has also neutralised the perception that the right of Muslim women seeking maintenance under secular provisions stood extinguished since 1986.

In holding that a divorced Muslim woman is not barred from invoking the secular remedy of seeking maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the Supreme Court of India has done well to clarify an important question concerning the impact of a 1986 law that appeared to restrict their relief to what is allowed in Muslim personal law alone. The enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, was a watershed moment that is seen as having undermined the country’s secular ethos by seeking to nullify a Court judgment in the Shah Bano case (1985), which allowed a divorced Muslim woman to apply for maintenance from a magistrate under Section 125 of the CrPC. Subsequently, the 1986 law was
upheld by a Constitution Bench in 2001 after coming close to declaring its provisions unconstitutional for discriminating against Muslim women. The Act was declared valid after the Bench read it down in such a way as not to foreclose the secular remedy for Muslim women. Several High Court judgments took different views on whether Muslim women should avail of Section 3 of the 1986 Act or Section 125 of CrPC. The latest verdict by a Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Augustine George Masih settles this question by holding that the codification of a Muslim woman’s rights in the 1986 Act including the right to maintenance during the Iddat period, provision for a dignified life until she remarries, and return of mehr and dowry was only in addition to and not in derogation of her right to seek maintenance like a woman of any other religion.
Justice Masih, in his main opinion, concludes that both the personal law provision and the secular remedy for seeking maintenance ought to exist in parallel in their distinct domains. While the CrPC may be invoked by a woman if she was unable to maintain herself, the 1986 Act makes it a Muslim husband’s obligation to provide for his divorced wife and her children up to a certain point. Justice Nagarathna, in her concurring opinion, looks at the social purpose behind the provision for maintenance in the CrPC, namely that it aims to prevent vagrancy among women by compelling the husband to support his wife. The 1986 Act codified the right available to a divorced Muslim woman in personal law. This right is in addition to, and not at the cost of, the rights available in existing law. The verdict is a great example of the Court using harmonious interpretation to expand the scope of rights as well as to secularise access to remedies. In the process, the Court has also neutralised the perception that the right of Muslim women seeking maintenance under secular provisions stood extinguished since 1986.

In holding that a divorced Muslim woman is not barred from invoking the secular remedy of seeking maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the Supreme Court of India has done well to clarify an important question concerning the impact of a 1986 law that appeared to restrict their relief to what is allowed in Muslim personal law alone. The enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, was a watershed moment that is seen as having undermined the country’s secular ethos by seeking to nullify a Court judgment in the Shah Bano case (1985), which allowed a divorced Muslim woman to apply for maintenance from a magistrate under Section 125 of the CrPC. Subsequently, the 1986 law was
upheld by a Constitution Bench in 2001 after coming close to declaring its provisions unconstitutional for discriminating against Muslim women. The Act was declared valid after the Bench read it down in such a way as not to foreclose the secular remedy for Muslim women. Several High Court judgments took different views on whether Muslim women should avail of Section 3 of the 1986 Act or Section 125 of CrPC. The latest verdict by a Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Augustine George Masih settles this question by holding that the codification of a Muslim woman’s rights in the 1986 Act including the right to maintenance during the Iddat period, provision for a dignified life until she remarries, and return of mehr and dowry was only in addition to and not in derogation of her right to seek maintenance like a woman of any other religion.
Justice Masih, in his main opinion, concludes that both the personal law provision and the secular remedy for seeking maintenance ought to exist in parallel in their distinct domains. While the CrPC may be invoked by a woman if she was unable to maintain herself, the 1986 Act makes it a Muslim husband’s obligation to provide for his divorced wife and her children up to a certain point. Justice Nagarathna, in her concurring opinion, looks at the social purpose behind the provision for maintenance in the CrPC, namely that it aims to prevent vagrancy among women by compelling the husband to support his wife. The 1986 Act codified the right available to a divorced Muslim woman in personal law. This right is in addition to, and not at the cost of, the rights available in existing law. The verdict is a great example of the Court using harmonious interpretation to expand the scope of rights as well as to secularise access to remedies. In the process, the Court has also neutralised the perception that the right of Muslim women seeking maintenance under secular provisions stood extinguished since 1986.

In holding that a divorced Muslim woman is not barred from invoking the secular remedy of seeking maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the Supreme Court of India has done well to clarify an important question concerning the impact of a 1986 law that appeared to restrict their relief to what is allowed in Muslim personal law alone. The enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, was a watershed moment that is seen as having undermined the country’s secular ethos by seeking to nullify a Court judgment in the Shah Bano case (1985), which allowed a divorced Muslim woman to apply for maintenance from a magistrate under Section 125 of the CrPC. Subsequently, the 1986 law was
upheld by a Constitution Bench in 2001 after coming close to declaring its provisions unconstitutional for discriminating against Muslim women. The Act was declared valid after the Bench read it down in such a way as not to foreclose the secular remedy for Muslim women. Several High Court judgments took different views on whether Muslim women should avail of Section 3 of the 1986 Act or Section 125 of CrPC. The latest verdict by a Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Augustine George Masih settles this question by holding that the codification of a Muslim woman’s rights in the 1986 Act including the right to maintenance during the Iddat period, provision for a dignified life until she remarries, and return of mehr and dowry was only in addition to and not in derogation of her right to seek maintenance like a woman of any other religion.
Justice Masih, in his main opinion, concludes that both the personal law provision and the secular remedy for seeking maintenance ought to exist in parallel in their distinct domains. While the CrPC may be invoked by a woman if she was unable to maintain herself, the 1986 Act makes it a Muslim husband’s obligation to provide for his divorced wife and her children up to a certain point. Justice Nagarathna, in her concurring opinion, looks at the social purpose behind the provision for maintenance in the CrPC, namely that it aims to prevent vagrancy among women by compelling the husband to support his wife. The 1986 Act codified the right available to a divorced Muslim woman in personal law. This right is in addition to, and not at the cost of, the rights available in existing law. The verdict is a great example of the Court using harmonious interpretation to expand the scope of rights as well as to secularise access to remedies. In the process, the Court has also neutralised the perception that the right of Muslim women seeking maintenance under secular provisions stood extinguished since 1986.

President Droupadi Murmu has approved the creation of the 23rd Law Commission of India. This new commission will be active from September 1, 2024, to August 31, 2027. The decision comes as the 22nd Law Commission’s term ends, and there were delays in pending reports due to the lack of a chairperson.
The 23rd Law Commission will consist of the following members: A full-time leader who will head the commission. Four full-time members, including a Member-Secretary. Two members who are Secretaries of the Legal and Legislative Departments. Part-Time Members up to five. 
The main purpose of the Law Commission is to review the Indian legal system and suggest improvements. They focus on making laws more effective and relevant to current needs.
The 22nd Law Commission faced difficulties after its Chairman, Justice Ritu Raj Awasthi, resigned. This led to delays in addressing important topics like the Uniform Civil Code and the idea of holding elections simultaneously across the country.
The 23rd Law Commission has several key objectives:

Review and Repeal of Obsolete Laws: Identifying old laws that are no longer needed and suggesting their removal. They will also develop a process to review laws regularly.
Law and Poverty: Evaluating how laws affect economically disadvantaged people and suggesting changes to benefit them.
Judicial Administration: Finding ways to reduce court delays and make the legal process more efficient.
Directive Principles and Constitutional Objectives: Ensuring that current laws align with the Directive Principles of State Policy, which guide the government’s policies.
Gender Equality: Proposing changes to laws to promote equality between men and women.
Revision of Central Acts: Simplifying important Central Acts (laws passed by the Parliament) to make them easier to understand and apply.
Government References: Handling specific legal issues referred to them by the government.
International Research Assistance: Providing legal research support to other countries.
Globalization Impact: Assessing how globalization affects key social issues, such as food security.
Additional Provisions
The Commission will make recommendations after consulting relevant stakeholders. These recommendations will be documented in both Hindi and English and will be accessible online. The Commission will also work with educational institutions to support legal research and education initiatives.

One of the prominent sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) is Section 302, which deals with the offense of murder. Murder is a grave crime that involves the intentional and unlawful killing of another person. Section 302 provides the legal framework to prosecute and punish individuals responsible for committing this heinous act.

 

According to Section 302 of the IPC, a person is said to have committed murder if they cause the death of another person with the intention of causing death or with the intention of causing bodily injury that is likely to result in death. The section recognizes the importance of intent and distinguishes murder from other offenses involving unlawful killings.

 

Section 302 encompasses various aspects related to murder, including different types of murder such as premeditated murder, murder by sudden provocation, and murder committed in furtherance of certain offenses. It also outlines the punishment for murder is severe, including death penalty or imprisonment for life, and may also include a fine depending on the circumstances and gravity of the crime.

The objective of Section 302 is to establish a strong deterrent against the act of murder and ensure that those who commit such acts face appropriate consequences. The law seeks to protect the sanctity of human life and provide justice to the victim and their family members. It also serves as a mechanism to maintain law and order within society by punishing individuals who unlawfully take the lives of others.

More and more women are getting into STEM — Science, Technology, Engineering and Math's courses in India, resulting in them landing jobs in corporate houses, especially in the IT sector. Hence, the proportion of women in leading corporate firms has increased considerably over time. Yet, the attrition rate, the percentage of employees who leave an organization, is also, in general, higher among women than men. Women leave organizations for many reasons, including societal pressure after marriage, pregnancy, and post-pregnancy work-life balance, reasons that rarely apply to men.
Adding to the list, workplace harassment — verbal, sexual or otherwise — may also play a role in such exits. If the number of cases reported under the PoSH Act is anything to go by, a look at just the figures from the top four IT firms shows that instances are rising again after a brief pause during the pandemic. The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act) was introduced over a decade ago to protect women against workplace sexual harassment.

Two observations made in different contexts by the Supreme Court of India have raised relevant issues concerning personal liberty. The cases related to actions under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), and the significance of these observations lies in the extent to which courts are inclined to protect personal liberty in the face of a determined government that wants its agencies to have their way. One concerned the question whether an officer arresting a person on money-laundering charges should demonstrate the necessity for arrest for the action to be deemed valid; and the other voiced shock and revulsion at the ease and quickness with which courts were staying reasoned orders granting bail. A Bench headed by Justice Sanjiv Khanna granted interim bail, for the second time since his arrest in March, to Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal, in the course of a discussion on the legality of his arrest by the Enforcement Directorate (ED). The 64-page verdict ended with a reference to a larger Bench the question whether the ED would have to prove the need or “necessity to arrest” a person, before effecting an arrest. Section 19 of PMLA speaks of the arresting officer being required to have “reason to believe” that the person is guilty of money-laundering before effecting arrest.

The PMLA casts a statutory obligation on an officer to both record reasons for arrest and convey grounds for arrest to the accused. Whether these obligations include a duty to demonstrate the necessity to arrest the person will have to be decided. It is established that the existence of a power is not sufficient justification for exercising it. The heartening feature of the Court’s order is that it lays down the view that the authorised officer’s decision on arrest ought to be rooted in compliance with statutory requirements, and one that a magistrate or judge can examine. The Court has also done well to reiterate that arrests under the PMLA cannot be on a mere whim; and that decisions during investigation should consider exculpatory material too, and not merely material against the accused. The other issue, regarding another Bench’s shock over courts staying bail orders, touches upon a key aspect of contemporary judicial functioning. The vehemence with which the prosecution argues its case, be it against bail or challenging a court’s order granting it, seems to be a major factor in the approach of higher courts. As the Bench noted, a stay on reasoned orders ought to be rare exceptions based on grounds such as perversity by the lower court, and not done as a matter of routine

Two observations made in different contexts by the Supreme Court of India have raised relevant issues concerning personal liberty. The cases related to actions under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), and the significance of these observations lies in the extent to which courts are inclined to protect personal liberty in the face of a determined government that wants its agencies to have their way. One concerned the question whether an officer arresting a person on money-laundering charges should demonstrate the necessity for arrest for the action to be deemed valid; and the other voiced shock and revulsion at the ease and quickness with which courts were staying reasoned orders granting bail. A Bench headed by Justice Sanjiv Khanna granted interim bail, for the second time since his arrest in March, to Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal, in the course of a discussion on the legality of his arrest by the Enforcement Directorate (ED). The 64-page verdict ended with a reference to a larger Bench the question whether the ED would have to prove the need or “necessity to arrest” a person, before effecting an arrest. Section 19 of PMLA speaks of the arresting officer being required to have “reason to believe” that the person is guilty of money-laundering before effecting arrest.

The PMLA casts a statutory obligation on an officer to both record reasons for arrest and convey grounds for arrest to the accused. Whether these obligations include a duty to demonstrate the necessity to arrest the person will have to be decided. It is established that the existence of a power is not sufficient justification for exercising it. The heartening feature of the Court’s order is that it lays down the view that the authorised officer’s decision on arrest ought to be rooted in compliance with statutory requirements, and one that a magistrate or judge can examine. The Court has also done well to reiterate that arrests under the PMLA cannot be on a mere whim; and that decisions during investigation should consider exculpatory material too, and not merely material against the accused. The other issue, regarding another Bench’s shock over courts staying bail orders, touches upon a key aspect of contemporary judicial functioning. The vehemence with which the prosecution argues its case, be it against bail or challenging a court’s order granting it, seems to be a major factor in the approach of higher courts. As the Bench noted, a stay on reasoned orders ought to be rare exceptions based on grounds such as perversity by the lower court, and not done as a matter of routine